Kennedy Graham

Open Letter to President Barack Obama

by Kennedy Graham

12 October 2009

Dr. Kennedy Graham, MP,

Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand

Wellington

 

Open Letter to President Barack Obama

 

Dear Mr President,

Congratulations on the award of the Nobel Peace Prize for 2009.  Many around the world will welcome the award and be inspired by the tribute accorded to you.  

The Prize, no doubt, reflects equally your achievements for peace in attaining the presidency itself as much as those recorded during the fleeting presidential period before closure of nominations.  It is not my purpose to over-rate your achievements to date or to query whether they are sufficient to have earned the high accolade that has been given to you.  The Nobel Committee members will be confident that they know what they are doing.

My purpose in writing is rather to consider the new political situation you are now in, and in some ways the new challenges you face, as a result of having been awarded the Prize.  For from now on, the peoples of the world will perceive you in a new light, with heightened expectations.  Those perceptions will reflect a daunting multiplicity of beliefs, apprehensions and hopes.  In a sense, the Prize has upped the ante for you in your strategic policy-making for the remainder of at least your first presidential term.

It seems there are two central challenges for you to address, as national commander-in-chief and now global peacemaker-in-chief.  One is the continuing existence of nuclear weapons in the world.  The other is the legitimising of the use of force for global governance.  The two are closely related, and you are at the centre of their vortex.

Your ringing, if carefully-crafted, declaratory rhetoric about creating the conditions for a nuclear-free world will come across to all as highly welcome.  How to translate that into practical initiative is less easy.  But the options do exist. 

They do not lie in tinkering at the margin with vertical non-proliferation measures such as, for example, test bans, fissile material cut-offs, or seeking ratification of the South Pacific Nuclear-free Zone’s Protocol, as important as those might be.  Nor do they even lie in greater assertiveness towards the horizontal non-proliferation regime, such as curtailing Iran and North Korea, India and Pakistan and, if we may dare mention it, Israel.  These are critical issues but they are not at the epicentre of the nuclear dilemma.  The dilemma is, actually, your country.  For yours is the leader – both politically and militarily.

The option lies in addressing the central reliance of the US itself on nuclear deterrence, both in force posture and doctrinal tenets.  For nuclear deterrence has, for over half a century, underpinned what passes for strategic stability, and it has been the US that has led the trend.  It is the US that first acquired the weapon, the US that offered to place it under international control, and when that extraordinarily visionary initiative failed, it is the US that has led the nuclear arms race.  And even today, it is the US (followed by the other four permanent members of the UN Security Council) that steadfastly refuses to lessen its reliance on nuclear weapons and deterrence theory.

To reduce the numerical surplus of nuclear weapons, from some 20,000 in the national arsenal to some 5,000 is laudable, but it does not confront the central challenge – which is to cross the threshold of minimal deterrence.  Russia and the others will follow, but the lead can only come from the US. 

In the 1980s, some countries used to propose a 20-year phase-out programme for a nuclear-free world.  The US and other major powers ignored the plan as if it did not exist.  Today, a refashioned and improved version lies before the UN – a nuclear weapons convention which would result in a nuclear-free world by 2030. 

Total bans have been put in place for chemical and biological weapons.  But unlike those weapons, the nuclear military machine is central to the global power configuration.  It will take huge political skill and courage – of the kind only that wins Nobel Peace Prizes – to lead the world through the psychological nuclear deterrence barrier, and towards a nuclear-free world that such a convention offers.

To get there requires equal courage on the other front – the use of force – because they are intimately related.  For the United Nations, as with the League of Nations before it, rested global stability on the idea of collective security using conventional weapons.  It is one of history’s greater ironies that a month after the ink on the UN Charter was dry, the world moved from the conventional to the nuclear age.

There are those who say that nuclear deterrence makes the world safe.  There are those who say the price is too high, through the risk of failure. Until the world agrees that global stability can be secured through conventional weapons again, with nuclear weapons either absent, or on a near-deployment status, or at least off high-alert, then we shall never be able to attain a nuclear-free world.

So the twin challenge is to wean the US, and the world, off nuclear deterrence and replace it with a credible alternative means of securing global governance through conventional weaponry. 

That brings us to the Afghanistan crisis.  For it is the litmus test of all of the above.

Your electoral success in exiting Iraq through re-focusing on counter-terrorism in Afghanistan was politically astute.  Yet in politics every solution bequeaths the next problem and, as you know well, Afghanistan could doom your presidency if it is not satisfactorily handled within your first term.  The Nobel Prize places you with excruciating precision between a rock and a hard place.  A troop surge will make the Prize twist hypocritically in the wind.  A rapid exit will produce a Republican presidential challenger to ‘save America from a weak dreamer whose Nobel Prize went to his head’.  You go down either road, now, at your political peril.

There is a third option.  It is to return to a genuine multilateralism at the United Nations – of the kind that the United States envisioned when it created the system in the 1940s.  Your records will show that defence officials reported to the US Congress in the mid-‘40s that it could provide a conventional military force in support of the UN.

Mr President, go back to the Security Council, once more in person, and refer the situation of Afghanistan to Member States for a genuine deliberation.  Not as in a US lead that has been worked out within the State Dept. the week before, calibrated in London and Paris, then cajoled through Moscow and Beijing before being imposed on the elected ten.  I mean refer Afghanistan to the UN, without a preconceived American solution.  Leave it to a Security Council committee to emerge with a proposal.

At the same time, reiterate US military support for a UN-led (not US-led) mission.  Only then will the conflict that has become a civil war in that country be handled in an objective manner, and nation-building become an authentic undertaking.  Only then will Taliban engage in dialogue.

Only then, when the UN is given a chance to function as an effective multilateral agency, not one brought to its knees by the US and major power rivalry; only then, will you have the twin opportunity of leading towards a world that does not have to rely on nuclear deterrence but can govern itself well.  Ditch the regional nuclear defence alliance system that is intoxicatingly addictive and hideously dangerous at the same time.  Adopt a global conventional collective security system that can evolve to something more sane, and civilised.

It is one almighty punt.  But the Nobel Prize gives you little choice, now.  And you are probably the only person, with the right skills and vision, in the right place at the right time, to be able historically to pull it off.  If you do not, probably no-one ever will.

 

With sincere respect,

 

Dr. Kennedy Graham, MP

Published in Featured | Justice & Democracy by Kennedy Graham on Mon, October 12th, 2009   

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